The Hobby Lobby Disaster—-from the Virginian-Pilot
The Supreme Court finished its term with a vitally important – and unfortunate – decision concerning religious freedom.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ruled 5-4 that for-profit corporations could opt out of generally applicable laws if they could demonstrate that abiding by the law would “substantially burden” their free exercise of religion. The high court ruled that Hobby Lobby and other like-minded businesses could exempt themselves from the Affordable Care Act’s requirements concerning contraception.
Hobby Lobby’s owners argued that the ACA substantially burdened their religious freedom because its requirements were objectionable to their beliefs. In this respect, the case seemed to be a classic example of a religious dissenter confronting the power of government. It was not. Instead, it embodied a clash of visions of religious freedom. The court had to choose between them.
Compliance with the ACA is not a burden on religious practice. If you choose to open a business, you must comply with rules of the marketplace that include everything from building codes to sanitation rules to employment laws. Abiding by provisions of the ACA that one does not like is no more of a burden on religious freedom than complying with speed limits or paying tolls when you are on the road.
Hobby Lobby argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts it from religiously objectionable laws. In agreeing with this argument, the court deviated radically from prior rulings dealing with religious use of drugs in Oregon (Employment Division v. Smith) and religious exemptions from historical preservation laws (City of Boerne v. Flores).
In those cases, the court ruled that it was contrary to religious equality to privilege religious exemptions from laws. Thus, it would be unfair to allow religious groups to use drugs with impunity while subjecting nonbelievers to criminal prosecution. It would be unfair to allow a church to ignore zoning laws while forcing a neighboring business to abide by them. In siding with Hobby Lobby, the court has opened the door to religious exemptions that it had previously denied.
More important, Hobby Lobby’s exemption constitutes a great potential infringement on the beliefs (religious or not) of employees who do not share their employers’ convictions. In essence, siding with Hobby Lobby enables businesses to qualify the terms of employment on the basis of their owners’ or board members’ religious beliefs.
In many ways, the decision flies in the face of some of the great civil rights decisions of the 20th century. Under the last vestiges of Jim Crow, some business owners sought to deny African Americans (or anyone else) employment, entry into their businesses, service at lunch counters, hotels, movie theaters and so forth on the premise that a business is one’s private property and that the owner is free to serve or deny service to whomever he or she chose.
The court ruled in all of those cases that when you enter into the marketplace, you must leave some of your private beliefs and convictions behind – regardless of their source – and play by generally applicable rules of fairness.
Of course, religious convictions and discrimination are radically different. But, when it comes to employment, business, or access to government benefits, neither can serve as a barrier to customers or employees.
The court did emphasize that the decision applies only to the contraception requirement. Nonetheless, the decision encourages any business owner with a religious objection to a law or government program to look to secure an exemption. Workers could gain or lose rights and access to government benefits whenever they change jobs or employers or even if their company is purchased or taken over.
No doubt, Hobby Lobby’s defenders will celebrate the decision as a great victory for religious freedom.
In fact, it is the opposite: it will create religious tension where there now is none and it will ensure that access to the marketplace and government benefits is subject to religious restrictions. This is an unfortunate decision. Let’s hope the Supreme Court has the chance to revisit – and reverse – it soon.
350 Words on why third parties can’t succeed in the USA
The recent survey by Pew (http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/) has folks wondering about the direction U.S> Politics is taking. America has a very moderate political tradition. It embodies an institutional and historical rejection of European party politics. During the Founding Era, James Madison wrote his celebrated Federalist 10 in which he lamented the evils of faction. Alas, they are necessary to politics and include the notion of political parties. (Madison later acknowledged the necessity of political parties).
But, the American political system is designed to make it difficult for third or minor parties to succeed. In recent decades we have seen independent presidential candidates such as John Anderson and Ross Perot rise and fall. The winner-take all electoral system is designed to defeat small ideological parties because it is nearly impossible for them to win.
Some scholars celebrate this. It prevents the proliferation of narrow, ideologically distinct political parties (such as those that might spring from right-wing movements like the Tea Party) and forces such movements to join the ranks of the two larger parties, moderate their views and form successful governing coalitions under the umbrella of the Democrats or Republicans.
Unfortunately, there is no doubt that the major parties have atrophied as a result of the lack of true challenges outside of the duopoly they operate. Campaign finance laws favor the major parties. Legislative and congressional districts are gerrymandered to ensure that only Democrats or Republicans can win. And, the winner take all electoral system dooms third parties to failure in the long run.
We could change all this. American cites use and experiment with alternative electoral systems that enable small parties to grow. Europe has had multiparty systems for some time and European democracy flourishes.
Alas, as we have seen in the wake of the defeat of Eric Cantor, as soon as the major parties perceive a threat to their duopoly, they can look to close ranks (or, in this case, the nomination process) to prevent small parties from gaining power. Ironically, in the land of the free market, the political marketplace has the highest barriers to entry.
Piketty-Peak higher education
Very interesting comments posted by my colleague @BryanAlexander on Inside Higher Education re: “Peak Education” in the USA (apropos, “peak oil”). Bryan emphasizes the extent to which the cost increases in higher ed will continue to render it more and more out of reach for all but the select few.
In the odd confluence of news articles department, an article appeared in the NYT on 18 April that detailed how the WH hosted the heirs to America’s vast fortunes. Amazingly, it was in the STYLE section–not Politics or whatnot.
All this in the midst of the sturm and drang over Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. Does higher education also reflect the trends that Piketty describes?
My Review of Michael Perry, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. Forthcoming, Law and Politics Book Review.
Vol.24 No.3 (2014) pp.xx-
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, by Michael J. Perry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Paper. ISBN: 97-1-107-66608
Reviewed by Mark Rush,
Michael Perry’s book is another important and provocative contribution to the literature on constitutional law and human rights. In it, Perry carefully argues that particular human rights are now essentially “entrenched” in the United States constitutional fabric. Judges should, therefore read the constitution as if those rights were actually in the text or, at least, interpret the constitutional text in a manner that promotes the entrenchment of the rights he discusses. These three rights are: The right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; the right to moral equality, and, the right to religious and moral freedom.
Specifically, he argues that the protection against cruel and unusual punishment renders the death penalty and torture unconstitutional. Moral Equality protects the right to same-sex marriage. Finally, religious and moral freedom embraces the right to an abortion. The principal basis for his conclusions is that the international rights community has moved clearly towards these visions of human rights. Furthermore, the trajectory of the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine indicates a general trend in this same direction. Accordingly, he concludes that these interpretations of rights are now, for all intents and purposes, entrenched in the U.S. Constitution.
Let me pause to say here that I found this to be an extraordinarily provocative, yet troubling book. On the one hand, I have nothing but great respect for Professor Perry’s work. Further, I do, for the most part agree with his positions on the issues of same-sex marriage, torture, capital punishment and abortion. Nevertheless, I found it quite difficult to agree with or be persuaded by the reasoning on which he bases his conclusions.
Granted, this is a work of political and legal philosophy and therefore, it should invite rebuttal and response along with agreement. So, in that spirit, I offer the following friendly, yet critical analysis of the rationale underpinning Perry’s conclusions. When dealing with such divisive issues, it is vitally necessary to construct airtight arguments to support one’s positions. Alas, I found that Perry’s reasoning is not as airtight as it needs to be to support his conclusions or persuade those who might not agree with him.
To begin, Perry’s argumentation swings back and forth from a reliance on positive power (relying, e.g., on the force of global majority opinion to conclude that life begins at conception) to making prima facie assertions about the moral unacceptability of, for example, the death penalty: “no matter what the crime, punishing a criminal, even a mentally competent adult, by killing him or her is excessive – it crosses the line – and is evidenced as such by the fact that capital punishment has become demonstrably unusual.” (p.85)
A particularly troubling aspect of his reasoning is, ironically, his reliance on global public opinion. Much of his argument about abortion, same-sex marriage, torture and punishment is grounded on the fact that international human rights laws and treaties have come to embrace the positions he supports. In this respect, part I of the book is a truly useful, clear and concise overview of trends in the development of human rights law over the last half century or so.
But, relying on the force of global public opinion is, inescapably, taking a positivist stand. Perry argues that, insofar as global public opinion generally condemns torture and capital punishment, maintains that life begins at birth and not at conception, and supports gay marriage, the U.S. should follow suit. While global consensus is important,. Perry’s argument in favor of supporting it in the U.S.A. begs the question: would he be as supportive of global public opinion if it took a contrary stance?
As well, the nature of Prof. Perry’s argument casts the U.S.A. in a paradoxical light: to the extent that American law might not agree with global public opinion, does the USA not, then take on the position of the Thoreauvian dissenter or conscientious objector whose moral principles are as entitled to respect and protection as those of the seeker of an abortion or same-sex marriage? I offer this point of view not to be argumentative but, instead, to note that the structure of Perry’s argument does leave the reader conflicted.
I found his analysis of the constitutional basis for banning capital punishment to be wanting. Perry and I would assuredly find common ground in our opposition to the death penalty, but for different reasons. His assertion that the ban against the death penalty is entrenched in the U.S. Constitution via the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is, with all due respect, incomplete at best and inconsistent at worst. The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments countenance the death penalty explicitly: neither life, liberty nor property may be taken without due process of law. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are no less entrenched than the Eighth.
Perry suggests that to the extent that most of the world’s nations have abolished the death penalty, it is now, indeed “unusual” as well as cruel (p.81). There is merit to this argument. But, it is not clear that “unusual” is necessarily synonymous with “uncommon.” Furthermore, there is no escaping the fact that majority support for a concept does not necessarily give it moral transcendence. Majority support provides most certainly a positive, powerful, perhaps Hobbesian basis for a law, but not necessarily a moral one.
Perry thoughtfully acknowledges the problem with a blanket ban on capital punishment when he alludes to Cathleen Kaveny’s “A Horrific Crime” (pp.83ff.). The reader can get the details of the unconscionable murder that Kaveny discusses in Perry’s text or in her article. Suffice to say that the quadruple assault/rape/abuse/homicide by various means involved would test anyone’s objection to capital punishment.
Perry quotes from Kaveny to demonstrate the cruelty and inhumanity of the death penalty:
The execution is a separate event from the crime. At the moment of execution, a criminal is helpless before the power of the state. We strap him to a gurney and snuff out his life. Can a society engage in this ritual while meaningfully advancing a commitment to the unconditional dignity of every human being? (p.85)
I note that Kaveny actually goes on to acknowledge that Thomas Aquinas himself suggested that the removal of some criminals from society is for the good of society – like removing a gangrenous limb. But, Kaveny maintains that criminals are, like Frankenstein’s monster, created by the society that wishes to kill them. Can society justify terminating their lives?
In the same way that Kaveny says that we must look at the criminals as part of society, so too must we look at the punishment as part of a series of events that includes many actions and choices by the criminals and that includes victims, and others. This is not a heartless, faceless, soul-less state that has chosen to make an example out of a hapless “helpless” defendant. The “helpless” defendant was in fact quite empowered perpetrating crimes – until the state, acting on behalf of the victims, caught him.
For many reasons, I do not support the death penalty. But, it is clear that there are moral reasons for supporting it. Even Justice Blackmun – who became one of the most outspoken critics of the death penalty – wrestled with the issue before changing his mind and declaring capital punishment unconstitutional. As Justice Blackmun noted in FURMAN V. GEORGIA: “I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. . . . Although personally I may rejoice at the Court’s result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped.”
Perry also struggles mightily with what would seem to be an easier case: banning torture. Yet, he acknowledges that, as Charles Fried notes, there may be, in unconscionably extreme situations, a justification for it – else the heavens (or the World Trade Center) might fall (p.51). In the end, Perry makes a reasonable suggestion that we should deal with such extreme situations as they arise and, meanwhile, maintain unqualified bans on torture. In this regard, he echoes Robert Jackson’s opinion in KOREMATSU v. U.S., where he argued, essentially, that the Supreme Court should not decide the case for fear of establishing a legal and constitutional precedent for race-based internment (or other) policies.
With regard to moral and religious equality, Perry contends that the rights to abortion and same-sex marriage are also entrenched in the U.S. Constitution. It is with regard to these two rights that I find his notion of constitutional entrenchment to be troubling. Perry states that a right is entrenched in a constitutional document if “constitutional enactors entrenched [the right] in the constitutional law [sic],” and it has not been superseded by subsequent constitutional action or amendment or constitutional right (p.57). So, essentially, a right is entrenched when someone entrenches it. Until then? Citing Robert Bork, Perry goes on to explain that an entrenched right is
a practice that is “so embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and public expectation of individuals and institutions,” that the Supreme Court will regard the practice or right as constitutionally authoritative. In some instances, this entrenchment is the result of Supreme Court decisions. (58)
This seems quite reasonable. But, as written, it would justify perpetuating clearly established practices that we might not approve.
On the one hand, Perry argues for a very broadly-defined notion of religious freedom: practices protected by religious and moral freedom include not just practices one believes oneself religiously and/or morally obligated to engage in (p.119). In this regard, virtually any firmly held beliefs or objections must be afforded religious and moral protection.
Yet, he also places qualifications on this broad definition. First, to be afforded religious or moral protection, a belief must be a “core or meaning-giving beliefs” not mere “fundamental preferences we display as individuals” (p.120). Second, he notes that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) regards religious rights as conditional (p.121). Not just any practice can be deemed “religious.” Accordingly, a government may ban or restrict a practice only if it
- Serves a legitimate government purpose;
- It does so in the least burdensome manner to belief-holders; and
- The good the government seeks must be justified by the burden on the exercise of the religious claim (p.122)
Accordingly, Perry cites REYNOLDS V. U.S. and LUNDMAN V. MCKOWN as demonstrations of how religious freedom does not extend to extreme practices such as polygamy or the denial of medical care to one’s children (p.121 n. 26). Citing Article 18 of the ICCPR, Perry condones such decisions because the ICCPR allows government to act to “protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (p.124).
This still leaves the reader hanging, though. Even a staunch advocate of rights to same-sex marriage may acknowledge that at least some of those who disagree might ground their antithetical positions on concerns of public safety, order, health, morals. So, how do we distinguish valid restrictions from invalid ones?
Perry thoughtfully offers a distinction between laws grounded on secular morality and those grounded in sectarian morality: “The right to religious and moral freedom leaves no room for the political powers that be to ban or otherwise regulate conduct based on sectarian belief that the conduct is immoral” (p.126).
Citing Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2004), Perry says that “public morals’ measures should reflect a pluralistic view of society, rather than a single religious culture” (p.125). This is a thoughtful and reasonable way to distinguish among truly secular policies and sectarian ones that might be cloaked in secular clothing. Still, it leaves the reader to wonder: How much overlap between a particular policy and a corresponding sectarian belief renders the former sectarian?
His discussion of world opinions concerning when life begins is instructive here. While some institutions and persons may regard the issue as a religious one, others – particularly those seeking an abortion, may not. Accordingly, to cast it as a religious issue does not necessarily strengthen the case for or against abortion rights. This is not an argument for or against a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy. But, I offer it, again, as an example of where readers may find Perry’s reasoning troubling even if they agree with his policy preferences.
In closing, the reader should not regard my points of view, queries and rebuttals as manifestations of anything less than respect for Perry’s thesis. One must respect another’s ability or capacity to find clear moral or otherwise principled grounds for particular stands on human rights. One who finds amoral or practical (or other) justifications for such stands – even one who agrees with Perry’s stands – still might find his reasoning less than convincing. Folks may share a cause, but not motivation.
That cause, which all certainly share, is the support of the principle stated in Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All Human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” In the end, and from the beginning, Perry makes his case against torture and capital punishment and in favor of rights to abortion and same sex marriage in this spirit of brotherhood. In HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Perry demonstrates that it is easier to share a cause than it is to agree on why we do so.
REFERENCES
Bork, Robert. 1997. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA. New York: The Free Press.
Kaveny, C. 2010 “A Horrific Crime”. https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/horrific-crime. 13
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations. Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ pages/ccpr.aspx
Joseph, Sarah, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, eds. 2004. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. New York: Oxford University Press.
CASE REFERENCES
FURMAN V. GEORGIA 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
KOREMATSU V. U.S.. 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
LUNDMAN V. MCKOWN, 530 N.W. 2D 807 (1995)
REYNOLDS V. UNITED STATES 898 U.S. 145 (1878)
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Copyright 2014 by the Author, Mark Rush.
American Democracy, competing with itself?
In the February 1-2 edition of The Wall Street Journal, we find an Opinion page that makes us wonder whether we are living in one country or…many. On the one hand, Walter Russell Mead (@wrmead) advocates (“A Strategy to Counter Democracy’s Global Deficit”– http://on.wsj.com/1bjLycJ) the export of American and liberal democracy through a more aggressive policy of spreading U.S. Education abroad and either through that initiative or in tandem with it, spreading the wisdom of the great western thinkers (Edmund Burke, Benjamin Franklin, Adam Smith, etc.) to the rest of the world by translating their works into other languages.
There is no question that the best defense is a good offense. Mead’s suggestion is an eloquent call for the spread of American ideals and liberal democracy through, perhaps, the best aspect of soft power: the university and the marketplace of ideas.
Nonetheless, if we turn to look above the fold on that same page, we find Peggy Noonan (@peggynoonannyc) describing an America that would seem to have little to offer to the rest of the world (“Meanwhile, Back in America…”– http://on.wsj.com/1fomJNF). There is something wrong when adherence to particular interpretations of liberal democratic principles may actually bring about an illogical if no undemocratic or illiberal result. Just ask the Little Sisters of the Poor as they struggle to abide by the mandates of ObamaCare or parents in Louisiana as they fight to retain access to school vouchers for their children.
Certainly, there are imperfections and inconsistencies in any nation or ideology. Nevertheless, if we wonder why the world seems to be resisting the spread of American or western-style democracy, we might simply pause to look first at our own house and get it in order. It’s hard to sell democratic principles to the rest of the world when they seem ideally suited to driving the U.S. Congress to continued brinkmanship with the nation’s budget and debt ceiling. The rest of the world scratched its head in wonder as the USA struggled simply to refine the filibuster. Turning to Europe, we see the wages of European democracy as country after country struggles to maintain an unsustainable economic vision.
From the perspective of the Middle East or Asia, while soft authoritarianism or illiberal democracy may not be ideal, it is not necessarily regarded as a bad option in comparison to the west. Across much of the Middle East, western style democracy—with free elections and freedom to organize politically—means trading stability, restricted freedom and perhaps peace for the freedom to spend every last waking minute battling the Muslim Brotherhood or other political forces who, because of their organizational skill and power, would easily take control through normal electoral means. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, “Democracy would therefore take up too many evenings” in battles essentially to protect ways of life that many folks already have.
Most certainly, one can look around the world and join Mead in lamenting that democracy and liberalism are not spreading their benefits. Political conditions in many parts of the world are appalling. But, it is sobering to realize that, as currently practiced, western democracy and liberalism do not present particularly attractive options.
More Second Thoughts on MOOCs?
The Babson Survey Research Group just released a report Entitled “Grade Change: Tracking Online Education in the United States.” The report is available http://sloanconsortium.org/publications/survey/grade-change-2013 and the Chronicle reports on it here.
There is still concern about MOOC quality, accepting MOOC credits from other institutions, etc. But, I think the key conclusion to draw from all of the ongoing research on MOOCs is that it is still too early to tell how and whether they are or will be sustainable.
I fear, however, that the debate about MOOCs has distorted the more important discussion about online education in general. A lot of good consortium-based work is being and can be undertaken through blended or hybrid courses. Around the world, where many have never had access to traditional, residential, four-year educational opportunities, online options present affordable means of access to university education.
In this respect, it is important to distinguish MOOCs from the online opportunities that truly embody a democratizing force in educational access and attainment. If online mechanisms can expand access to the best teachers and the best universities, how can we not celebrate that and work to improve the mechanisms by which that access is provided?
Science, Surveillance, the N.S.A and big data
The ruling by Judge Leon in Klayman et al v. Obama et al. was, well, peculiar to say the least. Judge Leon stayed his own ruling because it was clear from the outset that his opinion and the decision are going to be yet another phase of a conversation that will run for some time. Sure enough, another judge in New York said that the spying was constitutional. The Atlantic gives a nice overview of the dueling jurisprudence here. And we are most likely off to the Supreme Court…
Essentially, the Klayman ruling boils down to a discussion re: what we believe the scope and definition of the right to privacy–and, in particular, the reasonable expectation of privacy—are in the 21st century.
Life changed after 9/11 and the passage of the USA Patriot Act. Leon’s opinion makes great note of this. As well, technological advances do make possible abridgements of freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power” (Memorandum opinion, p. 64., citing James Madison, “Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on Control of the Military”. Available: https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48 .
Still, can we pretend to celebrate the benefits of big data and technological advances without acknowledging the threats they pose? I am reminded once again of the great discussion between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen. Should we limit our capacity to build upon and expand our knowledge because we fear the potential for its abuse?
This came up in a great chat I had with my colleague, Margaret Hu at the Washington and Lee law school. I had the privilege and thrill to hear her students’ final presentations in her “Federal Civil Rights Practicum.” A key theme was the concern about the threats posed by data collection to privacy.
We had a great discussion about the expansion of the use of DNA testing. Sure, on the one hand it may generate false positives. On the other hand, as Jeffrey Toobin @JeffreyToobin notes in the December 23 & 30 edition of The New Yorker, DNA testing has most likely caused a drop in the tendency to imposed the death penalty—precisely because it can be used to demonstrate the limits of less-or nonscientific proof. As well, as Virginia Hughes (@VirginiaHughes) wrote in National Geographic (http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2013/05/15/could-dna-databases-curb-human-trafficking/), while dicey still, the potential benefits from the use of DNA to stop human trafficking are truly awesome. But, how to manage the possibilities of abuse of the data?
I guess the question with which we now confront ourselves is how to regard knowledge and its advancement. Do we regard it through a lens colored by fear of abuse or one colored by confidence that abuse can be managed while we reap the benefits of scientific research?
Darkness and ignorance may appear to remove sin when, in fact, they merely obscure it. Light, at least, illuminates.
Online ED and Moocs
Interesting to see the report in the current MIT Tech Review that laments the precipitous drop in MOOC participation rates. (http://www.technologyreview.com/view/522816/data-mining-exposes-embarrassing-problems-for-massive-open-online-courses/)
The article cites “Learning about social learning in MOOCs: From statistical analysis to generative model”, by Christopher Brinton of Princeton and several colleagues. In a study of 73 Coursera courses, there were 171,197 threads, 831,576 posts, and 115,922 distinct students (page 4). Based on their analysis, Brinton et al. determine that MOOCs suffer two debilitating troubles:
First, there is a sharp decline rate in course activity. “The amount of interaction in forums rapidly drops soon after a course is launched.”
Second, they suffer Information overload: “As courses reach a larger audience, often the forum is flooded by discussions from many students; thus it quickly becomes infeasible for anyone to navigate the discussions to find relevant information.”
One of the interesting discoveries, for example, is that the teaching staff’s active participation in the discussion on average increases the discussion volume but does not slow down the decline rate. (page 2)
Kinda interesting to read about all this in the same magazine that had proclaimed that MOOCs, etc. were revolutionizing the higher ed industry: http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/429376/the-crisis-in-higher-education/
(There is also a great piece in there to the tune of “You promised me colonies on Mars and all I got was Facebook:-))
I think an important issue/problem is the debate about MOOCs is that “MOOC” is used as shorthand to refer to virtually anything outside of the traditional classroom. This is inaccurate and misleading. Around the world, tech is an absolutely democratizing force that is making it possible to bring education—and better education—to remote areas, poor areas, etc. where it is simply not feasible to build bricks, mortar and ivy campuses (viz. the Maldives) or where, particularly at primary levels, one can metaphorically toss a pile of iPads in a kindergarten schoolyard and, in an hour, the smarties will have figured the things out and in 90 minutes, they’ll be helping the other kids do so.
The scaling problems in the Brinton study remind me of experiences in my various online fantasy leagues. You want to see heated, engaged, thoughtful discussion? Pay attention to the couple of weeks either side of the opening draft. After a month, tho, when the league pretty much shakes out, the chatter dies down (until, at least in baseball, the mid season trading deadline).
I do wonder if their analysis of the decrease in participation is not reflected in other uses of online fora that we use for classes. Absent some sort of grade-based incentives, how eager are students to chat online much? Do they prefer email/tweets among closer companions as opposed to public proclamations on the class forum? Do rates and findings differ between large and small classes?
I’ve read that there is a huge melt from enrollments to finishers in the MOOC courses. I do wonder how the actual finishers do. So long as MOOCs are free, I suspect this trend will continue. Once folks start charging, enrollments will plummet.
One thing I found intriguing was the comment about teacher/staff participation: it increases discussion volume but still did not decrease the decline rate. So, it seems that successful online fora require some sort of Webmaster to monitor and even censor content. This is the case with several listservs to which I subscribe.
So, MOOCs aren’t dead. We still can learn a lot from them and gain from the knowledge they will produce about online education. As the recent piece by Tamar Lewin (@tamarnyt) in the New York Times indicated (“After Setbacks, Online Courses are Rethought” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/us/after-setbacks-online-courses-are-rethought.html?_r=0), this is clearly perhaps the end of Round 1 in this discussion.
Are the Humanities Doomed? (reprise)
There is a great and important piece in the WSJ from 6 June entitled “Are Humanities Degrees Doomed? Experts Weigh in.” http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2013/06/06/whats-a-college-student-to-study-experts-weigh-in/tab/comments/#comment-134283
Hardly the first piece on the subject. Still, I wonder…
I believe we get distracted when we focus on what to major in. Promoting liberal education is not the same as—nor does it require—promoting particular majors. Majors have been in retreat for some time as colleges and universities have developed interdisciplinary programs.
“Liberal” Education is a model based on the overused term “critical thinking.” Whether we like it or not, engineers, accountants and physicists engage in critical thinking as much as English or Political Science majors. Successful, safe bridge building requires critical thinking as much as does thoughtful literary criticism.
The real issue that educators must face is that there is a difference between justifying the value of a liberal education and justifying the cost. While the former may be enduring, it is clear that the latter has become formidable in the eyes of many students and parents. As well, technology has made it easier for our children to learn how to acquire information and how to critique it at their own and at a younger age. It has democratized access to information regardless of one’s social class or wealth—in this regard, it is indeed, a triumph of liberal values.
So, back to the article: The question is not whether one should major in English, Philosophy, Engineering, Biology, Math…etc. Instead, the question higher ed must answer is: How much of each of those fields (and the many other fields of undergraduate study) necessary to liberally educating our young people? Is the four year, 120 credit, expensive, residential model of university life still absolutely necessary for everyone?
From NO to GO
I wrote this a while back. It highlights a great piece by @RogerCohen on the #ArabSpring.
Mark Rush 